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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/ ) 
Respondent, ) 
) PETITION FOR 
vs. ) WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
ROBERT EUGENE JONES, ) Court of Appeals No. 890332-CA 
Defendant/ ) Cateqory No. 1 
Appellant. ) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS 
AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND DECIDE A MATTER 
OVER WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS 
ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION; NAMELY, A CAPITAL FELONY 
CONVICTION, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78-2-2(4)(a). 
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS 
RENDERED A DECISION SO FAR DEPARTING 
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN FAILING TO 
ADDRESS POINT ONE AS CONTAINED 
IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS TO CALL FOR AN 
EXERCISE OF THIS COURTfS POWER OF 
SUPERVISION. 
REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is a petition 
requestinq this Court' to review the official Opinion filed 
November 21, 1989, in the Utah Court of Appeals involvinq the 
case State of Utah v. Robert Eugene Jones, The Opinion is 
attached hereto in the Appendix as Exhibit 2. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review 
Defendant's Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)(a) and (5) and Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals pertinent 
hereto was filed November 21, 1989. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4)(a): 
"The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals 
any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisidctxon, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an 
interlocutory order of a court of record involving a 
charge of a capital felony." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, ROBERT EUGENE JONES, was charged on or about 
March 14, 1983, by Information with Murder in the First Degree, a 
Capital Offense; Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony; and 
Attempted Murder in the First Degree, a First Degree Felony (R. 
If 2, 3). Defendant was convicted as charged in a trial by jury 
held August 29, 1983, through September 7, 1983, in the Second 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0, Hyde, presiding 
(R. 68-83). On September 15, 1983, Judge Hyde sentenced 
Defendant to the Utah State Prison for terms as follows: Life on 
the charge of Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense; Not 
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Less than Five Years and May Be for Life on the charge of 
Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony; and Not Less than 
Five Years and May Be for Life on the charge of Attempted 
Criminal Homicide, First Degree Felony (R, 149-151, 155). The 
sentences were run concurrent (R. 170). A Notice of Appeal was 
filed on October 13, 1983 (R. 166) . 
Defendant's case was reversed on appeal by the Utah 
Supreme Court February 26, 1987, and remanded for a new trial (R. 
1851) Attorney Ginger Fletcher entered as counsel for Defendant 
on April 28, 1987 (R. 1860). Defendant was convicted in a second 
trial by jury held June 22-30, 1987, in the Second Judicial 
District court, the Honorable David E. Roth presiding (R. 1906-
1916, 2095, 2099, 2105). When Defendant was convicted the second 
time, he was convicted of the following offenses: Murder in the 
First Degree (R. 2099); Aggravated Burglary (2105); and of lesser 
included offense of Attempted Second Degree Murder, a Second 
Degree Felony (R. 2095). 
On July 13, 1987, Defendant's attorney, Ginger 
Fletcher, moved to withdraw as Defendant's counsel due to an 
apparent conflict with the Defendant, which Motion was granted 
(R. 2108, 2862-2863). Attorney Robert L. Froerer, an attorney 
with the Weber County Public Defenders Association, entered as 
defense counsel July 20, 1987 (R. 2109). On September 2, 1987, 
Judge Roth sentenced the Defendant to the Utah State Prison for 
terms as follows: Life in Prison on the charge of Murder in the 
First Degree, a Capital Offense; Not Less than Five Years and May 
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Be for Life on the charge of Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree 
Felony (R. 2181); and Not Less then One nor More Than 15 Years on 
the charge of Attempted Second Degree Murder, a Second Degree 
Felony (R, 2183). All sentencing terms were run concurrent (R. 
2129, 2130). 
Defendant filed, pro se, a Motion for New Trial on the 
morning of September 9, 1987 (R. 2148), while on the same day in 
the afternoon Defendant's attorney, without knowledge of the 
prior filing by Defendant, filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 2180, 
2185). That appeal was subsequently voluntarily dismissed on 
defense counsel's motion on January 12, 1988 (R. 2804). 
After some delay in Defendant's actions attempting to 
appoint new counsel (R. 2805, et. seq., 2836, 2839), a hearing on 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial was held on July 19, 1988 (R. 
2845), which Motion was denied by Judge Roth (R. 2848). A Notice 
of Appeal was filed with the Utah Supreme Court August 5, 1988 
(R. 2851) . 
During the briefing period, but prior to oral 
arguments, the Supreme Court transfered the case to the Court of 
Appeals (Appendix, Exhibit 1). The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the lower Court's decision in its Opinion filed November 21, 1989 
(Appendix, Exhibit 2). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Issue One 
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS AUTHORITY TO 
HEAR AND DECIDE A MATTER OVER WHICH THE SUPREME COURT 
-7-
HAS ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION; 
NAMELY, A CAPITAL FELONY CONVICTION, PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-2-2(4) (a) . 
Pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4)(a), a Notice of Appeal was originally 
filed in this matter with the Utah Supreme Court on August 5, 
1988 (R. 2851). Appellant's Brief was subsequently filed on or 
about March 15, 1988, in the Utah Supreme Court. 
On or about May 23, 1989, counsel received notification 
that this matter had been assigned to the Court of Appeals (see 
Appendix, Exhibit 1). It is the memory of Defendant's counsel 
that notice was also received from the Utah Supreme Court 
assigning the case to the Court of Appeals, but such notice is 
not available to include herein. The Respondent's Brief and the 
Appellant's Reply Brief were subsequently filed in the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Oral arguments were heard, and a decision rendered 
and filed November 21, 1989, affirming the conviction and 
sentence of the lower Court. 
Issue Two 
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED A DECISION 
SO FAR DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN FAILING TO ADDRESS POINT ONE AS 
CONTAINED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS TO CALL FOR AN 
OF THIS COURT'S POWER OF SUPERVISION. 
Prior to Defendant's first trial and after an 
evaluation which took place at the State Hospital, a hearing was 
held May 10, 1983, in which Defendant was found to be incompetent 
to stand trial and was remanded to the custody of the Utah State 
Hospital (R. 47-54). On June 13, 1983, another hearing was held, 
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at which Defendant was found competent to stand trial (R. 55) . 
At the first trial, members of his family testified that after 
the Defendant got out of his military service, he seemed to have 
changed. He was like two different people. His sister, Doris 
Kennedy, testified that one minute he is one person and the next 
he is someone else, and the someone else isn't a very nice 
person. He's ornery and irrational (R. 1035-1037). She further 
testified that when Defendant changed, his physical 
characteristics would also change, including his voice and facial 
appearance (R. 1040). 
Defendant's father, Robert Jones, Sr., testified that 
when Defendant was in the military, the chaplain called him and 
said that he felt his son was mentally ill and he should try to 
get him out of the service (R. 1149). He further testified that 
when his brother, Denny, died in 1967, Defendant was devastated, 
and that the Defendant had been in and out of mental institutions 
eight to ten times during the last eight years (R. 1151) . 
Bobbie Jones, Defendant's mother, testified that while 
Defendant was in the Army he was put in a mental hospital in 
Colorado after he went AWOL (R. 1102). She further testified 
that Defendant had been in other mental hospitals, and that he 
had been working with the mental health department for over eight 
years (R. 1103) . She further testified that generally he is a 
sweet, beautiful person that you love to be around, but that he 
seemed to turn into a second person (R. 1105 and 1106) . 
The other victim in this shooting, Beverly Jones, 
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testified in the preliminary hearing prior to the first trial 
that while in the Chapman residence, she thought the Defendant 
was crazy and "looked like he was high on something. He wasn't 
the same Robert...it was just a different, whole different 
personality, like a really rotten mean person" (R. 39). She 
further stated that, having known him for quite awhile, that at 
times he was pretty rational and decent, and that at other times 
he was not, and that on that night his eyes appeared to be glazed 
over (R. 40). She testified similarly in Defendant's first trial 
as well (R. 993, 994) . 
Nathan Joseph Webster, who was a police officer 
assisting in the arrest of the Defendant, described him in the 
first trial as being incoherent and agreed that Defendant's "eyes 
were glazed, appeared to be somebody that if you didn't know 
anything else about him that he would either be heavily 
intoxicated or medicated or been through some harrowing 
experience." (R. 722, 723.) In Defendant's second trial 
sentencing hearing, Officer Webster testified that when he first 
saw Defendant he had a glazed or dazed look (R. 2723). 
Though, as indicated above, Defendant had a long 
history of mental problems, the issue of mental competency was 
not raised1 during his second trial. However, during the 
sentencing phase of the second trial, Dr. Alma Carlisle, the head 
of the psychology department at the Utah State Prison, testified 
regarding the mental problems suffered by Defendant. 
Dr. Carlisle testified that Defendant suffered from two 
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distinct mental illnesses/disorders. One is a multiple 
personality disorder (R. 2688 and 2715, see also 2686). It was 
also Dr• Carlisle1s opinion that the Defendant suffers from 
another mental illness called bi-polar disorder or manic-
depressive disorder (R. 2692-2693 and 2686) , 
A stipulation was entered into between Defendant and 
the state in which it was aqreed that Dr. Van Austin, a 
psychiatrist, would testify, had he been present at the hearinq, 
that Defendant is sufferinq from manic-depression and is takinq 
lithium for treatment of such (R. 2726). 
Dr. Carlisle testified that it's possible that one 
sufferinq from manic-depression or bi-polar disorder miqht commit 
a crime wherein his behavior is a product of the mental illness 
(R. 2716) and, further, that, in reqard to the multiple 
personality illness, one sufferinq from such is not totally in 
control as one whole person is (R. 2699, 2675, 2676, 2677). 
Dr. Carlisle also testified that a normal person's 
thouqht processes would be consistent in committinq a crime from 
beqinninq to end, and that there "seems to be more responsibility 
for that [type of] individual than for a multiple, who is, to a 
deqree, out of control" (R. 2718). 
After the evidence was presented to the Court at 
Defendant's sentencinq hearinq September 1, 1987, before the 
Honorable David E. Roth, the Court stated the followinq: 
"This is a sentencinq hearinq, and I'm not here to 
determine whether the Defendant had a disorder that 
would, or an illness that would, excuse his conduct or 
the offense. Obviously, those issues, if they were 
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qoinq to be raised, would have been raised at trial. 
THEY WERE NOT." [Emphasis added.] 
(R. 2750-2751.) 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND 
DECIDE A MATTER OVER WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS 
ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION; 
NAMELY, A CAPITAL FELONY CONVICTION, PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-2-2(4)(a). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (4) (a) , the Utah 
Supreme Court has original and arguably exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over capital felony convictions. This particular 
grant of jurisdiction is exclusive to the Supreme Court, in that 
the Utah Code has prescribed which cases the Supreme Court 
may transfer to the Court of Appeals and which cases it must 
retain. The Code clearly reserves review of capital felony 
convictions and certain other matters as listed therein to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is exclusive to eh Court 
which has jurisdiction over the offense. Objections to such 
cannot be waived. 
"With respect to objections to the jurisdiction of the 
Court in criminal prosecutions, a distinction is to be 
made between those which involved jurisdiction of 
fundamental rights of accused and those which involve 
merely personal privileges of accused; the former 
cannot be waived, but the latter can. 
"Accordingly, objections on the ground that the Court 
is not a legal Court or that it has no jurisdiction 
over the offense or subject matter or that the 
indictment information or Complaint fails to charge an 
offense cannot be waived, but may be raised at any 
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time." 22 CJS §175, Criminal Law, p. 212, See also 
Johnson v. State, 611 P.2d 1137, 1145 (Okla., 1980). 
See also State ex eel. Baumert v. Municipal Court of 
the City of Phoenix, 606 P. 2d 33 (Ariz. App. 1979). 
Defendant hereby asserts his objection to the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter as 
being improper. 
Based on the fact that this case was transfered by the 
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals without authority 
to do so, the decision rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals must 
be stricken and held to be void. Defendant's appeal must proceed 
through the Utah Supreme Court as if a transfer to the Utah Court 
of Appeals had never taken place. 
Point Two 
THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED A DECISION SO FAR 
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN FAILING TO ADDRESS POINT ONE AS 
CONTAINED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS TO CALL FOR AN 
EXERCISE OF THIS COURT1S POWER OF SUPERVISION. 
The standard of review applied to cases where the 
assistance of prior counsel is challenged has been established by 
the United States Supreme Court. The Court has stated, "To 
succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires 
a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the 'counsel1 guaranteed the Defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 
467 U.S. 1267 (1984), 80 L.Ed.2d 674; see also State v. 
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401 (Utah, 1986). And further, in order to show prejudice 
-13-
to his case, defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
the confidence of the outcome. Str ickland, 466 U.S. at 649, see 
also Morehouse, 748 P.2d at 219; State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 
1019, 1023 (Utah, 1987); State v. Wynia, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 16. 
Defendant claims the following deficiency: Counsel 
Ginger Fletcher did not bring to light in any manner Defendant's 
mental illness/disorders, even though ample evidence was 
available regarding a long history of mental illness suffered by 
Defendant. 
As noted above, several witnesses testified in 
Defendant's first trial regarding the history of his mental 
condition. They described that at one point in time Defendant 
would be a nice person, but then he would switch and become an 
ornery and irrational person. His history in and out of mental 
hospitals and treatment programs was also outlined fully, as set 
forth above (pp. 8-10, supra). 
Dr. Alma Carlisle, the head psychologist at the Utah 
State Prison, testified in Defendant's sentencing hearing (second 
trial) about the mental illnesses suffered by Defendant, calling 
one a multiple personality disorder and the other a bi-polar 
disorder, or manic-depressive illness. Dr. Carlisle also 
testified that one suffering from multiple personality disorder 
is not totally in control as one whole person is, and further 
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that there seems to be more responsibility for an individual who 
would have consistent thought processes than for a multiple who, 
to a degree, is out of control (pp. 10-12, supra). 
These facts raise the issue of whether or not the 
Defendant had the capacity to form the intent required by statute 
to commit the crimes he was charged with, tltah Code Ann. §76-2-
101, et seq.; §76-2-305. The issue of whether or not the 
Defendant was competent to stand trial and the effect of 
Defendant's mental illnesses in relation to his ability to form 
the requisite intent should have been addressed prior to and/or 
during Defendant's second trial. Utah Code Ann. §77-14-3• The 
lower Court refused to address this issue at Defendant's 
sentencing hearing after prior counsel withdrew because the issue 
was not raised during the trial (R. 2750-2751). Certainly a 
finder of fact would find such facts very interesting, and to 
have such evidence before them might w£ll bp dispositive of the 
case . 
The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming 
Defendant's conviction is not supported by the evidence. 
Defendant argues that prior counsel was ineffective and failed to 
present available evidence of Defendant's mental illness/ 
disorders to the jury. The Court of Appeals chose not to 
address the issue pertaining to Defendant's mental illness/ 
disorders, stating that prior counsel's conduct consisted of 
legitimate trial strategy or resulted in no prejudice to 
Defendant, specifically citing in Footnote 8 of the Opinion that 
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the testimony at Defendant's sentencing hearing given by Dr• Alma 
Carlisle, a Utah State Prison psychologist, negated theories that 
Defendant was incompetent to stand trial or lacked the capacity 
to form the requisite intent to commit the crimes (Opinion, p. 
9} . 
However, a review of the record indicated above shows a 
marked difference between Dr. Carlisle's actual statements and 
the Utah Court of Appeals1 interpretation of those statements. 
The Defendant has a long history of mental problems. The issues 
of mental competency and Defendant's inability to form the 
requisite intent were not raised during his second trial. The 
Court of Appeals should have addressed this obvious failure on 
the part of Defendant's prior counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant believes that his case was improperly 
transfered from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to the statute cited herein and hereby objects 
thereto. 
He further contends, as a second issue, that the Utah 
Court of Appeals rendered a decision that so far sanctioned a 
departure from the accepted and usual view of judicial 
proceedings by a lower Court as to call for an exercise of this 
Court's power of supervision (referencing his argument pertaining 
to failure of the Utah Court of Appeals to address the issues of 
his mental condition) . 
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Based on the foregoing issues and arguments, Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to grant him a review of this 
matter in full. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^k)^ d^y of December, 1989, 
IL4rf''. 'AM^ 
ROBERT L. FROERER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the </-[bA <$ay of December, 
1989, I mailed, postage prepaid, four true artd correct copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to R. Paul Van Dam, 
Attorney General, and Sandra Sjogren, Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84114. 
h/U)tW\ 
ROBERT L. FROERER 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
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H3 
Re: State v. Jones 
Court of Appeals No* 890332-CA 
Dear Counsel: 
The above-referenced case has been assigned to the Court of Appeals. 
Further proceedings will be handled by this court. Please note that 
the case number at the Court of Appeals is 890332-CA and should be 
indicated on all future filings. 
The Court of Appeals will observe the due date established by the 
Supreme Court for the respondent's brief, which is June 7, 1989. 
Sincerely, 
Julia Whitfield 
Case Management Clerk 
cc: 
Second District Court 
Weber County 
Criminal No. 15283 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Robert Jones, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890332-CA 
F I L E D 
NOy.211989 
5cyT Noor*n 
»rK of *« Court 
t\ C«urt & Appeals 
Second District, Weber County 
The Honorable David E. Roth 
Attorneys: Robert L. Froerer, Ogden, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood and Croft.1 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Robert Jones appeals his convictions of first 
degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and aggravated 
burglary in connection with the murder of Kim Chapman (Kim) and 
the shooting of Beverly Jones (Beverly). Defendant urges 
reversal of his conviction, claiming that he was denied 
effective counsel. 
Defendant, who is not related to Beverly by blood or 
marriage, met her in 1979. They later began living together in 
a home Beverly purchased next door to defendant's parents. 
Their relationship deteriorated, and in October 1982, defendant 
moved out of Beverly's home and in with his parents next door. 
In November 1982, Beverly began dating Kim. Beverly 
testified at trial that defendant frequently followed and 
threatened them. Once, the police were summoned when defendant 
x 
Go 
H 
i-3 
to 
1. Bryant H. Croft, Senior district judge sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 
1989). 
confronted them at a bowling alley armed with, what appeared to 
Beverly to be, a pistol. Beverly also testified that on 
February 16, 1983, defendant entered her home and held her at 
gunpoint. According to Beverly, defendant told her that he 
would wait for Kim to arrive to blow his head off. Beverly 
managed to telephone Kim who then called the police. Defendant 
was charged criminally as a result, and a hearing was set for 
the week after March 11, 1983. Following this incident, 
Beverly stayed in the basement of Kim's parents' home at 
night. In March 1983, just prior to the shooting, defendant 
offered a friend $5,000 to assist him in killing Kim and asked 
another acquaintance to help him disguise himself so Kim and 
Beverly would not recognize him when he went after them. 
On the evening of March 11, 1983, defendant entered the 
Chapman home. Kim's parents, Earl and Eva Chapman were 
upstairs in bed, Beverly's children were in their beds in a 
basement bedroom, and Kim and Beverly were in the main room of 
the basement watching television. According to Beverly's 
testimony, defendant suddenly appeared from the basement 
hallway carrying a gun. He instructed her to tie Kim's hands 
with a rope and then with a cord, but she pretended to be 
unable to do so. At approximately twenty inches distance, 
defendant then pointed the gun at Kim. When Kim reached out to 
touch defendant's arms, defendant fired the gun, striking Kim 
in the chest. Defendant then fired a series of shots at 
Beverly, striking her in the hand and right flank. Another 
shot struck Kim in the forehead. Defendant then fled the scene. 
Although defendant did not testify at trial, his counsel 
claimed that defendant did not enter the Chapman home intending 
to shoot Kim and Beverly, but to convince Beverly to leave Kim 
and go away with him. Allegedly, a struggle broke out during 
which defendant, in self-defense or by accident, shot Kim and 
Beverly. 
Immediately following the shooting, Earl Chapman and Eva 
Chapman went down to the basement. After surveying the scene, 
they went upstairs, called the police, and waited for help. 
Neither the Chapmans nor the police found a gun in the basement. 
Later that night, defendant appeared at the home of an 
off-duty sheriff's deputy and said he thought he had just 
killed someone. Months later, in the early part of the summer 
of 1983, defendant told a police officer, who was transporting 
defendant, that he killed Kim. 
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The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder for 
the killing of Kim, attempted first degree murder for the 
shooting of Beverly, and aggravated burglary. On appeal/ the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded 
the case for a new trial for reasons unrelated to this 
appeal.2 After a second trial, the jury found defendant 
guilty of first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, 
and aggravated burglary. Following a hearing, the district 
court denied defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground 
that trial counsel was ineffective. 
On appeal, defendant claims he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel and cites five specific instances where 
his counsel's conduct was assertedly prejudicial: (1) failure 
to pursue a theory regarding chain of custody of the murder 
weapon; (2) failure to present evidence of defendant's alleged 
mental illness; (3) lack of consultation and misleading 
statements by counsel to defendant; (4) calling only three 
witnesses out of the twenty-three who were subpoenaed; and (5) 
failure to adequately cross-examine witnesses. 
INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the United States 
Supreme Court standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984), for determining the existence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial. State v. Gardner, 101 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989); State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 893 
(Utah 1989); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 118-19 n. 2 (Utah 
1989). To establish ineffectiveness of counsel under the 
Strickland standard, "a defendant must show, first, that his or 
her counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." Carter, 776 
P.2d at 893. Further, H[o]n appeal, defendant must overcome 
the strong presumption that his counsel's assistance was 
adequate," State v. Moritzskv. 771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), and "exercised reasonable professional judgment." State 
v. Bullock. 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36 (1989). See also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986) . 
2. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 1987). 
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1. CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF GUN 
We first examine defendant's claim that counsel's failure 
to pursue evidence concerning the chain of custody of the 
murder weapon, constituted ineffectiveness of counsel. With 
regard to custody of the murder weapon, defense counsel had 
access to the following information: (1) although defendant 
had purchased two .38 caliber guns, one of which he gave to 
Beverly, and had been given another .38 caliber gun by Roger 
Birt prior to the shooting, none of these three guns were used 
in the shooting; (2) Officer Norm Soaki of the Ogden City 
Police Department, obtained a .38 caliber gun from a pawn shop 
that ballistics tests and Chris Singleton identified as the 
weapon that shot Kim and Beverly; (3) Harvey Blarney, the 
registered owner of the gun used in the shooting, purchased the 
gun prior to the shooting from a pawn shop in Ogden and the 
same day gave the gun to Renold Hastie; (4) Hastie and Norwood 
Fridal used the gun in a series of armed robberies prior to and 
after the shooting; (5) Hastie sold the gun to Chris Singleton, 
who then gave the gun to Mike McDill, who, at Singleton's 
request, pawned the gun; (6) Hastie and Fridal denied having 
known defendant at the time of the shooting; (7) Soaki 
testified at the first trial, that he was unable to connect 
Singleton, Hastie or Fridal to defendant; (8) defendant's 
father told counsel, John Caine and Maurice Richards, who 
represented defendant during the first trial, that Beverly was 
connected to some of the people involved in the custody chain; 
(9) in his motion for a new trial, defendant alleged that Chris 
Norvall, his ex-wife, was somehow connected to Hastie and 
Fridal and had a social relationship with Beverly; (10) in an 
evidentiary hearing after the first trial, Caine and Richards 
admitted they were unable to connect Hastie or Fridal to 
Beverly; (11) in the same evidentiary hearing, Soaki testified 
he was unable to connect Singleton, Hastie, or Fridal to 
Beverly; (12) an affidavit of Soaki states that defendant's 
sister, Le Ann Carter, personally led Soaki to Hastie's house 
and toid Soaki that the resident of the house was a good friend 
of defendant and might have the gun; and (13) counsel for the 
State testified that there were rumors that defendant was a 
"wheelman" for the robberies committed by Hastie and Fridal. 
Defendant claims he was unarmed when he entered the 
Chapman house. He hypothesizes that Beverly had brought the 
gun into the Chapman basement. According to defendant, Beverly 
obtained the gun from defendant's ex-wife, Chris Norvall, who 
defendant alleges is linked with Fridal and Hastie. Defendant 
conjectures that immediately following the shooting, Beverly, 
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although wounded# retrieved the gun and hid it. She then 
enlisted the help of an accomplice who retrieved the gun from 
the Chapman basement and returned it to Norvall who then 
returned it to Fridal and Hastie. 
In the second trial, counsel did not pursue the gun 
custody issue. A ballistics expert testified regarding the 
bullets fired from the murder weapon, but made no mention of 
which gun fired the bullets. The only reference made to the 
identification of a gun during trial was the testimony of Roger 
Birt. Birt testified that he and defendant, shortly before the 
shooting, practiced shooting with the .38 caliber gun that he 
had purchased for defendant. 
Defendant asserts that counsel's performance was markedly 
deficient because counsel failed to tell the jury that the 
weapon Birt referred to was not the gun used in the shooting 
and failed to probe the gun's custody chain. Probing the gun 
custody issue would have, according to defendant, supported his 
claim that he was unarmed when he entered the Chapman home. 
Defendant contends that proving he was unarmed when he entered 
the Chapman home would have corroborated his claim that he 
entered the home solely to talk with Beverly, thereby negating 
the applicable intent elements of the aggravated burglary,3 
first degree murder4 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978) states in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on 
any person. 
4. Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1989) states in pertinent 
part: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree 
if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another under any of the following circumstances: 
(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of 
death to a person other than the victim and the actor. 
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor 
was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit . . . 
aggravated burglary, burglary • . . . 
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and attempted second degree murder,5 charges of which he was 
convicted.6 
a. COUNSEL•S PERFORMANCE 
When assessing counsel's performance, we will not second 
guess trial counsel's legitimate use of judgment as to trial 
strategy. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "Trial 
tactics lie within the prerogative of counsel and may not be 
dictated by his [or her] client. Decisions as to what . . . 
defenses to interpose are generally left to the professional 
judgment of counsel." Carter, 776 P.2d at 894 n.31 (quoting 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 988 (1982). 
Counselfs decision to avoid pursuing the chain of custody 
issue was a reasonable trial strategy. Attempting to show that 
defendant was incapable of intentionally or knowingly shooting 
Kim and Beverly, counsel wanted to portray a lovesick and 
cowardly defendant with only one problem in life: his 
affection for Beverly. Probing the custody issue would have 
required an 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989) states in pertinent 
part: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second 
degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death 
of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life 
that causes the death of another . . . . 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, he engages in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another . . . . 
6. In his brief, defendant also argues that Beverly's alleged 
invitation to him to visit her at the Chapman home negated the 
element of burglary requiring an unlawful entry, see section 
76-6-202(1), and further supported his claim that his sole 
intent was to see Beverly. Although in the first trial, 
defendant testified that Beverly invited him to the Chapman 
home and told him where to find the key, defendant mistakenly 
states that this point was made in the second trial. We find 
nowhere in the record where this fact was presented to the jury. 
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in-depth cross examination of Officer Soaki and disclosure of 
defendant's alleged connection with armed robbers, thus 
weakening defendant's position. 
The soundness of counsel's judgment is substantiated by 
the determination of defendant's counsel in the first trial, 
Caine and Richards, to also avoid pursing the custody issue. 
At trial, they elicited a statement from Officer Soaki that he 
could not tie the murder weapon to defendant and then they 
promptly terminated the cross-examination. During the 
evidentiary hearing that followed the trial, they testified 
that they avoided the custody issue to prevent Soaki from 
connecting defendant to Hastie and Fridal. Counsel for the 
State, on the other hand, testified that they hoped Caine and 
Richards would pursue the custody issue so they could present 
information to the jury connecting defendant to Hastie and 
Fridal. 
Admittedly, important distinctions exist between the first 
and second trials. First, because the death penalty was not 
imposed in the first trial, it was a nonfactor in the second 
trial. Caine and Richards admitted they were trying in the 
first trial, to present defendant in the most positive light to 
avoid the death penalty. Second, Caine and Richards 
inaccurately assumed that the murder weapon was one of the two 
.38 caliber guns defendant had purchased. In the second trial, 
counsel knew the actual identity of the murder weapon. Third, 
Caine and Richards were unaware of Blarney and McDill's 
involvement in the chain of custody and of Singleton's 
identifying the gun as the murder weapon prior to the 
ballistics tests. These facts were known to counsel in the 
second trial. 
These differences, however, did not necessitate a change 
in strategy in the second trial. Caine and Richards testified 
that although the additional information would have 
corroborated defendant's story that he did not take the gun to 
the house, they had serious reservations about the wisdom of 
pursuing the custody issue because of the danger of linking 
defendant with Hastie and Fridal. Further, even though counsel 
was not faced with the possibility of a death penalty in the 
second trial, they still wanted to convince the jury that 
defendant was simply an unarmed heartbroken intruder, who 
lacked the courage and requisite intent or knowledge to commit 
the crimes. Linking defendant to Hastie and Fridal could have 
tarnished their portrayal of defendant. "Whenever there is a 
legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the choice of 
trial strategy, the fact that it did not produce the expected 
result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel." 
Bullock, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. 
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We find that defendant has not sufficiently shown that the 
decision made by trial counsel to eschew the chain of custody 
theory was not merely tactical choices or that counsel's 
performance in this regard falls below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. 
b. PREJUDICE 
To demonstrate that counsel's performance prejudiced him, 
defendant has the burden to "affirmatively show that a 
reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective 
counsel/ the result would have been different."7 Verde, 770 
P.2d at 119 n.2. (quoting State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909, 913 
(Utah 1988)). We find it highly unlikely that the result would 
have been different had counsel pursued the custody issue. 
Although proving that he was unarmed when he entered the 
Chapman home may have bolstered his defense that he lacked the 
requisite intent to shoot Kim and Beverly, we are struck by the 
improbability of defendant's theory that Beverly hid the gun 
after being shot. Several witnesses, including Kim Chapman's 
parents and police officers, testified that there was no gun at 
the scene after defendant left. Save his own opinion that 
Beverly was somehow connected to Chris Norvall, Hastie, and 
Fridal, defendant offers no evidence to support his theory. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial 
overwhelmingly indicates that defendant intended to seriously 
harm Kim and Beverly. Defendant twice admitted that he shot 
Kim and Beverly; he previously threatened to kill them both; he 
approached others to help him carry out his murder plans; he 
purchased a gun and practiced shooting prior to the shooting; 
and he was facing criminal charges for previously assaulting 
Beverly in her home. 
We find it improbable that the jury would have decided 
differently if the gun custody issue had been pursued. We, 
therefore, hold that defendant, by inadequately showing 
prejudice and deficiency of performance by counsel under the 
Strickland test, fails to overcome the strong presumption of 
effective counsel. 
7. This court may consider the two issues of (1) whether the 
conduct of counsel was below the specified standard and (2) 
whether the conduct prejudiced defendant in what ever order 
seems appropriate, State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 n.27 
(Utah 1989), and in some cases, resolution of one issue may 
obviate the need to deal with the other. In this case, 
however, we believe the issue of prejudice relative to the gun 
custody issue was sufficiently problematic to merit analysis. 
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2. OTHER ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES 
Following a thorough review of the record and briefs 
before us, we find that the remaining allegations of deficient 
performance that defendant argues constitute ineffective 
counsel/ are without merit. Generally/ the conduct cited by 
defendant consists of legitimate trial strategy8 or resulted 
in no prejudice to defendant. Recognizing that we "need not 
analyze and address in writing each and every argument/ issue/ 
or claim raised properly before us on appeal/- Carter, 776 P.2d 
at 888/ we decline to detail our analysis of the remaining four 
deficiencies. To address them would amount to unecessary 
verbiage and a redundant literary exercise. I£. at 889. We 
state, simply/ that defendant fails to demonstrate that the 
remaining deficiencies show that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and that counsel's performance prejudiced 
the defendant. 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
8. For example, defendant claims his counsel should have 
argued he was incompetent to stand trial or lacked the capacity 
to form the requisite intent to commit the crimes. Testimony 
at defendant's sentencing hearing/ however/ by Dr. Alma 
Carlisle, a Utah State Prison psychologist, negated those 
theories. Exclusion of the theories was, therefore, a 
legitimate trial strategy. 
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PART 1 
CULPABILITY GENERALLY 
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct 
and criminal responsibility. 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct 
is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, reck-
lessly, with criminal negligence, or with a men-
tal state otherwise specified in the statute defin-
ing the offense, as the definition of the offense 
requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving 
strict liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not 
apply to the violations set forth in Title 41, Chapter 
6, unless specifically provided by law. 1983 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — 
Strict liability. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall re-
quire a culpable mental state, and when the defini-
tion of the offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to es-
tablish criminal responsibility. An offense shall in-
volve strict liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose crim-
inal responsibility for commission of the conduct pro-
hibited by the statute without requiring proof of any 
culpable mental state. 1963 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with 
intent or willfully"; "knowingly, or 
with knowledge"; "recklessly, or mali-
ciously"; and "criminal negligence or 
criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully 
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with re-
spect to his conduct or to circumstances sur-
rounding his conduct when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct or the existing circum-
stances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowl-
edge, with respect to a result of his conduct when 
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain 
to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the re-
sult of his conduct when he is aware of but con-
sciously 'disregards a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that the circumstances exist or the re-
sult will occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordi-
nary person would exercise under all the circum-
stances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances sur-
rounding his conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise in 
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 1974 
76-2-104. Conduct — When defined as offense. 
Conduct is an offense if a person engages in it with 
criminal negligence. Conduct is also an offense if a 
person engages in it intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly. Conduct is an offense if a person engages 
in it recklessly, the conduct is an offense also if a 
person engages in it intentionally or knowingly. Con-
duct is an offense if a person engages in it knowingly, 
the conduct is an offense also if a person engages m it 
intentionally 1973 
ou 
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the 
defendant to the jury at trial. Any order by the court 
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be ap-
pealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the 
defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the 
defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial 
where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his 
past convictions for felonies and any testimony given 
by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be 
used to impeach his testimony at trial. 1973 
76-2-304. Ignorance or mis take of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mis-
take of fact which disproves the culpable mental state 
is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence 
or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime 
unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor 
reasonably believed his conduct did not consti-
tute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the 
actor's reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law con-
tained in a written order or grant of permis-
sion by an administrative agency charged by 
law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law 
contained in an opinion of a court of record or 
made by a public servant charged by law 
with responsibility for interpreting the law 
in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of 
fact or law may constitute a defense to the offense 
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser 
included offense of which he would be guilty if the 
fact or law were as he believed. 1974 
76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a de-
fense. 
(1) It is not a defense to the crime of child kidnap-
ing, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; rape of a child, 
a violation of Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a 
child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; sodomy upon 
a child, a violation of Section 76-5-403.1; or sexual 
abuse of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-404.1; or 
an attempt to commit any of those offenses, that the 
actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 14 years of 
age or older at the time of the alleged offense or was 
unaware of the victim's true age. 
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of unlawful sex-
ual intercourse, a violation of Section 76-5-401, or an 
attempt to commit that crime, that the actor mistak-
enly believed the victim to be 16 years of age or older 
at the time of the alleged offense or was unaware of 
the victim's true age. 1983 
76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense — 
Influence of alcohol or other substance 
voluntarily consumed — Definition. 
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any stat-
ute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of 
mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an 
element of the offense charged. Mental illness is not 
otherwise a defense. 
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the 
defenses known as "insanity" and "diminished men-
tal capacity." 
(3) A person who is under the influence of volun-
tarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled sub-
stances, or volatile substances at the time of the al-
leged offense is not excused from criminal responsi-
bility on the basis of mental illness. 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or de-
fect. A mental defect may be a congenital condition or 
one the result of injury or a residual effect of a physi-
cal or mental disease. Mental illness does not mean a 
personality or character disorder or abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. 1986 
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxicat ion. 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a 
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the 
existence of the mental state which is an element of 
the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal neg-
ligence establishes an element of an offense and the 
actor is unaware of the nsk because of voluntary in-
toxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prose-
cution for that offense. 1973 
76-2-307. Voluntary termination of efforts prior 
to offense. 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in 
which an actor's criminal responsibility arises from 
his own conduct or from being a party to an offense 
under Section 76-2-201 176-2-202] that prior to the 
commission of the offense, the actor voluntarily ter-
minated his effort to promote or facilitate its commis-
sion and either: 
(1) Gave timely warning to the proper law en-
forcement authorities or the intended victim; or 
(2) Wholly deprives his prior efforts of effec-
t iveness in the commission. 1973 
76-2-308. Affirmative de fenses . 
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affir-
mative defenses. 1973 
PART 4 
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
76-2-401. Justification as defense — When al-
lowed. 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecu-
tion for any offense based on the conduct. The defense 
of justification may be claimed: 
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of 
persons or property under the circumstances de-
scribed in Sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of 
this part; 
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable and 
in fulfillment of his duties as a governmental of-
ficer or employee; 
(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable dis-
cipline of minors by parents, guardians, teachers, 
or other persons in loco parentis; 
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable dis-
cipline of persons in custody under the laws of 
the state; 
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for 
any other reason under the laws of this state. 
1973 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible 
felony defined. 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using 
force against another when and to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a person is 
justified in using force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodilv injury only if he reason-
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receipt of the list provided herein or at such other 
time as the court may direct, shall file and serve the 
defendant with the addresses, as particularly as are 
known to him, of the witnesses the state proposes to 
offer to contradict or impeach the defendant s alibi 
evidence 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall 
be under a continuing duty to disclose the names and 
addresses of additional witnesses which come to the 
ittention of either party after filing their alibi wit-
ness lists 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to 
comply with the requirements of this section the 
court may exclude evidence offered to establish or 
rebut alibi However, the defendant may always tes-
tify on his own behalf concerning alibi 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the 
requirements of this section 1980 
77-14-3. Insanity or diminished mental capacity 
— Notice requirement — Expert testi-
mony. 
(1) When a defendant proposes to offer evidence 
that he is not guilty as a result of insanity or that he 
had diminished mental capacity or any other testi-
mony of a mental health expert to establish mental 
state, he shall, at the time of arraignment or as soon 
afterward as practicable, but not fewer than 30 days 
before the trial, file and serve the prosecuting attor-
ney with written notice of his intention to claim the 
defense 
(2) When either the prosecution or the defense in-
tends to call any mental health expert to testify at 
trial regarding a defendant's mental state, excluding 
rebuttal testimony, the expert shall be required to 
prepare a written report of findings, and counsel in-
tending to call the expert shall provide a copy of any 
report to opposing counsel as soon as practicable, but 
act less than ten davs before trial 
(3) If the defendant fails to meet the requirements 
ofSubsection (1), he may not introduce evidence tend-
ing to establish the defense unless the court for good 
cause shown otherwise orders 
(4) Nothing in this section is intended to require 
the admission of evidence not otherwise admissible 
1986 
77-14-4. Mental examination of defendant — 
Appointment, report, testimony, and 
compensation of examiners — Cooper-
ation of defendant — Notice of rebuttal 
— Admissibility of other evidence. 
Q) When the court receives notice that a defendant 
intends to claim that he is not guilty as the result of 
msanity or that he had diminished mental capacity, 
the court shall appoint two examiners qualified in 
farensic mental health to examine the defendant and 
investigate his mental condition Thev shall testify at 
the request of the court or either party m any pro-
ceeding m which the testimonv is otherwise admissi-
ble. When the defendant is held in jail pending trial, 
the evaluations may be conducted in the jail 
(2) The defendant shall make himself available 
ad fully cooperate in the examination by the court 
©pointed examiners and any other independent ex-
auners for the defense and the prosecuting attorney 
If the defendant fails to make himself available and 
felly cooperate, and that failure is established to the 
atisfaction of the court at a hearing prior to trial the 
defendant is barred from presenting expert testimonv 
relating to his defense of mental llln^s at the tnal of 
the case The examiners shah complete the examina-
tion within 30 days after the court's order, and shall 
prepare and provide to the court prosecutor and de-
fense counsel a written report concerning the condi-
tion of the defendant 
(3) Within ten days after receipt of the report from 
the examiners, but not later than five days before the 
tnal of the case, or at any other time the court di-
rects, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve 
upon the defendant a notice of rebuttal of the defense 
of mental illness, which shall contain the names of 
witnesses the prosecuting attorney proposes to call m 
rebuttal 
(4) The reports of the Utah State Hospital or any 
other independent examine** may be admissible in ev-
idence upon the stipulation of the prosecution and 
defense 
(5) Examiners appointed under Subsection (1) 
shall be allowed fees that the court determines to be 
reasonable The fees allowed by this section shall be 
paid by the county, except when the offense is a state 
offense, the state shall pay all of the expense Travel 
expenses shall be charged to the county where prose-
cution is commenced Examination of defendants 
charged with violation of municipal or county ordi-
nances shall be charged to the entity commencing the 
prosecution 
(6) This section does not prevent any party from 
producing any other testimony as to the mental con-
dition of the defendant Expert witnesses who are not 
appointed by the court are not entitled to compensa-
tion under Subsection (5) except on order of the court, 
for good cause shown 
(7) This section does not require the admission of 
evidence not otherwise admissible 1986 
77-14-5. Hearing on mental condition of defen-
dant found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity — Placement under Psychiatric 
Security Review Board and commit-
ment to state hospital — Jurisdiction 
of board — Procedures. 
(1) When a jury renders a verdict or a court enters 
a finding of "not guilty by reason of insanity," the 
court shall then conduct a hearing within five days to 
determine if the defendant is presently mentally ill 
The defense counsel and prosecutors mav request fur 
ther evaluations and may present testimony from 
those examiners 
(2) After the hearing and upon consideration of the 
record, if the court finds bv clear and convincing evi-
dence that the defendant is still mentally ill and be-
cause of that mental illness presents a substantial 
danger to himself or others, the court shall order him 
placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Secu-
rity Review Board established under Section 77-38-2 
and committed to the Utah State Hospital 
(3) The defendant shall be under the jurisdiction of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board until he is dis-
charged m accordance with Chapter 38 of this title 
The board's jurisdiction mav not extend beyond the 
maximum sentence the court finds the defendant 
could have received had he been found guilty of the 
offense charged At the time the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board's jurisdiction expires, involuntary civil 
commitment proceedings may be instituted in accor 
dance with Part 2, Chapter 12, Title 62A 
(4) With regard to persons who have been commit 
ted to the Utah State Hospital bv the court under this 
section prior to Jul} 1 1989 the effective date of this 
act the following procedures applv 
(a) Within 60 dav<? after that date the supenn 
tendent of the Ltah ^tate Hospital or lvs desig 
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78-1-3. Effect of act on election functions. 
(1) Any justice or judge of a court of record, whose 
taction to office was effective on or before July 1 
1985, shall hold the office for the remainder of the 
tenn to which he was elected The justice or judge is 
subject to an unopposed retention election as provided 
by law at the general election immediately preceding 
the expiration of the respective term of office 
(2) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose 
appointment to office was effective on or before July 
1,1985, is subject to an unopposed retention election 
is provided by law at the first general election held 
mote than three years after the date of the appoint-
ment 
(3) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose 
appointment to office was effective after July 1,1985 
a subject to an unopposed retention election as pro-
fided by law at the first general election held more 
than three years after the date of the appointment 
1988 
CHAPTER 2 
SUPREME COURT 
Section 
78-2-1 Number of justices — Term — Chief justice 
and associate chief justice — Selection 
and functions 
78-2-15, 78-2-1 6 Repealed 
78-2-2 Supreme Court jurisdiction 
78-2-3 Repealed 
78-24 Supreme Court — Rulemaking judges pro 
tempore, and practice of law 
78-2-5 Repealed 
78-2-6 Appellate court administrator 
78-2-7 Repealed 
78-2-7 5 Service of sheriff to court 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14 Repealed 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Term — Chief jus-
tice and associate chief justice — Se-
lection and functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be ap-
pointed initially to serve until the first general elec-
tion held more than three years after the effective 
fcteof the appointment Thereafter the term of office 
of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years and 
commences on the first Monday in January next fol 
lowing the date of election A justice whose term ex-
pies may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council 
•nul a successor is appointed and qualified 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a 
dnef justice from among the members of the court by 
majority vote of all justices The term of the office of 
duef justice is four years The chief justice may not 
«ve successive terms The chief justice may resign 
from the office of chief justice without resigning from 
the Supreme Court The chief justice may be removed 
from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice 
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office the asso-
ciate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a 
dnef justice is elected under this section If the asso 
oate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act as 
duef justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
usace until a chief justice i& elected under this sec 
tan. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a 
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has 
additional duties as provided by law 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief jus-
tice The term of office of the associate chief justice is 
two years The associate chief justice may serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms The 
associate chief justice shall be elected by a majority 
vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines If 
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice The chief justice, where not inconsistent with 
law, may delegate responsibilities to the associate 
chief justice 1988 
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6. Repealed. 1971,1981 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic-
tion 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals, 
(c) discipline of lawyers, 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission, 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica-
tive proceedings originating with 
d) the Public Service Commission, 
(n) the State Tax Commission, 
(in) the Board of State Lands and For-
estry, 
(IV) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, or 
(v) the state engineer, 
(0 final orders and decrees of the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (e), 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution, 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi-
tal felony, 
(D appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and 
(j) orders, judgments and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony, 
(b) election and voting contests 
(c) reapportionment of election districts 
(d) retention or removal of public officers 
(e) general water adjudication, 
(f) taxation and revenue and 
(g> those matters described in Subsection (3Ma) 
through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1989 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, j udges 
pro t empore , and prac t i ce of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to c o u r t 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal. 1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment Th»*p»nfter. the term of office of a 
judge of the Court ot Appeals i«? six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow-
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall electa 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d> carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appea l s jur i sd ic t ion . 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over. 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions ot the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs involving: a criminal convic-
tion, except those involving a first degree or capi-
tal felony; 
sions of this rule and all other rules of appellate pro-
cedure 
(Amended, effective January 1 1987 ) 
Rule 41. Certification of questions of law by 
United States courts. 
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court may in its discretion an-
swer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court 
of the United States when requested to do so by such 
certifying court acting m accordance with the provi-
sions of this rule, but only if the state of the law of 
Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying 
court is uncertain and answering the certified ques-
tion will not unduly interfere with the Utah Supreme 
Court's regular functioning or be inconsistent with 
the timely and orderly development of the decisional 
law of the state 
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court referred to m 
Paragraph (a) may invoke this rule by entering an 
order of certification as described in this rule. When 
invoking this rule, the certifying court may act either 
sua sponte or upon a motion by any party 
(c) Certification order. 
(1) A certification order shall be directed to the 
Utah Supreme Court and shall state 
d) the question of law to be answered, 
(n) that the question certified is a control-
ling issue of law in a proceeding pending be-
fore the certifying court, and 
(in) that there appears to be no control-
ling Utah law 
(2) The order shall also set forth all facts 
which are relevant to the determination of the 
question certified and which show the nature of 
the controversy, the context in which the ques-
tion arose, and the procedural steps by which the 
question was framed. 
(3) The certifying court may also include in 
the order any additional reasons for its entry of 
the certification order that are not otherwise ap-
parent. 
(d) Form of certification order; submission of 
record. A certification order shall be prepared by the 
certifying court, signed by the judge presiding over 
the proceeding giving rise to the certification order, 
and forwarded to the Utah Supreme Court by the 
clerk of the certifying court under its official seal The 
court, m its discretion, may then require that certi-
fied copies of all or any portion of the record before 
the certifying court be filed with this court if, in the 
opinion of this court, the record or a portion thereof 
may be necessary in determining whether to accept 
the certified question or in answering that question. 
(e) Acceptance or rejection of certification. 
Upon filing of the certification order and accompany-
ing papers with the clerk, the court shall promptly 
enter an order either accepting or rejecting the ques-
tion certified to it, and the clerk shall thereupon 
serve copies of this court's order upon the certifying 
court and all parties identified in the certification 
order If the court accepts the question for adjudica-
tion, the court will set out in the order of acceptance 
(l) the specific question or questions accepted, (n) 
those portions of the record which shall be copied and 
filed with the clerk of this court, and (m) a schedule 
for the filing of briefs and for oral argument by the 
parties The form of briefs and proceedings on oral 
argument shall thereafter be governed by Rules 21 
through 40 of these rules It mav be presumed that 
the court will give the matter expedited treatment 
<D Fees. The fees for filing an order of certification 
in this court shall be the same as for filing and dock-
eting a notice of appeal in a civil appeal in the court 
Snd the cost shall be equally divided between the par 
ties to the cause unless otherwise ordered by the cer-
tifying court in its order of certification 
(g> Association of counsel. Upon acceptance by 
the court of the question of law presented by the certi-
fication order, counsel for the parties not licensed to 
Practice law in the state ol Utah shall associate a 
Member m good standing of the Utah State Bar in 
Connection with all further proceedings before the 
Court 
(h) Issuance of opinion on certified question! 
The court will issue a written opinion that will be 
Published and reported A copy of the opinion shall be 
transmitted by the clerk under the seal of the court to 
the certifying court and to the parties identified ifl 
the certification order 
(Added, effective January 1, 1987 ) 
TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
&ule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and de-
crees of Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of t 
Judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to 
>^ 'decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be initi-
ated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the So-
fcreme Court of Utah 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 ) 
#ule 43, Considerations governing review (j( 
certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter i 
hght, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
Only when there are special and important reason 
therefor The following, while neither controlling nor 
Wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals ha 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision 4 
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law, 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in i 
way that is in conflict with a decision of thu 
court, 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals ha 
rendered a decision that has so far departed frai 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
mgs or has so far sanctioned such a departure bj 
a lower court as to call for an exercise of ths 
court's power of supervision, or 
(4) WTien the Court of Appeals has decided a 
important question of municipal, state, orfedeni 
law which has not been, but should be, settled bj 
this court 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987; 
Rule 44. Certification and transmission cf 
record; filing; parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and » 
vice. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the tu» 
provided by Rule 45 pay the certiorari docketing f* 
and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule2L 
ten copies of a petition which shall comply m all r* 
spects with Rule 46 The case then will be placed a. 
the certiorari docket of the court Counsel for thepefr 
tioner shall serve four copies of the petition oncost 
sel for each partv separately represented It shall fr 
